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Abstract: This paper argues that sovereignty, as envisaged by Spinoza, is the 
logical foundation of constitutional economics. Constitutional constructs such 
as sovereignty weave an evolutionary dialectic between different organizational 
scales (the local, national, and global). This dialectic continues to wreak havoc 
at the local scale, and can be interrupted only through explicit constitutional 
constraints on the size of jurisdictions. The paper argues for more emphasis on 
constitutional orders in the spirit of Spinoza’s understanding of sovereignty. This 
entails preference for federal polities in which sovereignty is shared between 
different cities rather states where once capital cities dominate. 
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Introduction
In The Calculus of Consent, Buchanan and Tullock (1962) state that the political 
ideas of Baruch Spinoza, ‘in many respects … may be taken as the most appropriate 
chosen classical precursor to [constitutional economics]’ (p. 313). Notwithstanding 
this endorsement, the authors do not investigate Spinoza’s rendition of sovereignty. 
Instead, they point out that: 
Spinoza’s influence on our own ideas has been limited to his general and indirect 
effects on the Western intellectual tradition. In a specific sense, we have carefully 
reviewed Spinoza only after the completion of an initial draft of the main body of 
this book [The Calculus of Consent]. (p. 313)
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In The Calculus, one of the foundational works in constitutional economics, the 
word ‘sovereignty’ appears only four times; two of these appearances are in the 
appendices, and not as the subject of analysis but as a reference point for the models 
therein. A similar marginalization of sovereignty can be seen in recent works. For 
example, in a monograph entitled The Calculus of Consent and Constitutional 
Design (Dougherty 2011), the word ‘sovereignty’ appears only once—in the 
introduction. This is problematic not only because sovereignty is closely related to 
the evolution of the state, but because, through the temples of constitutional order, 
sovereignty became the shaman of all economic activity.[1]
Sovereignty is a fundamental pillar of the capitalist world economy. Mercantilism 
led to the first constitutional rationalization of the exercise of sovereign power 
as a practice of government (Foucault 1991). Later, the nation state, through its 
legislative monopoly, became indispensable to the conduct of economic enterprise. 
Probably the strongest evidence of the link between sovereignty and economics 
comes from the idea of legal tender and the historical evolution of (national) 
territorial currencies. The same can be said about the rise of central banks and 
their influence, through sovereignty, on economic activity. Some would argue 
that the tendency to grant independence to central banks and the creation of non-
national currencies such as the euro signify the increasing irrelevance of sovereignty 
(Helleiner 2003). However, a quick glance at the euro crisis (which continues to 
unfold in 2013) shows why such logic is wanting. In fact, the current drive within 
the European Union for economic integration (through the euro) is matched with 
a similar political integration.[2] If anything, this suggests a resilient link between 
economics and politics. Even the analysis of what some theorists perceive as the 
‘decline’ of sovereignty is also framed in reference to economic systems, in which the 
‘decline’ of sovereignty today is seen as a ‘sign of the acute crisis of capitalism as an 
historical system’ (Wallerstein 1999, p. 33).
The link between economics and sovereignty suggests that the latter should be at the 
heart of economic analysis. This is more so in the case of constitutional economics, 
given its focus on the analogy between markets and politics. It is difficult to see 
how constitutional economics can treat the subject of choice among constraints 
without an examination of as fundamental a constitutional concept as sovereignty. 
Observing that sovereignty is becoming less and less relevant in a world with 
increasing economic integration not only misses the point of the choice among 
constraints, but also amounts to a misunderstanding of the concept of sovereignty The Journal of Philosophical Economics VII:1 (2013) 4
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itself. Historically, sovereignty has been, and continues to be, a response mechanism 
to forms of universitas, the current exemplar of which is globalization.[3]
Admittedly, just as with most political concepts, sovereignty is intrinsically 
controversial (Walker 1990). Nevertheless, sovereignty has a common denominator 
that makes it a viable explanatory variable. This denominator is seen in a (political) 
power struggle between three scales: the local, the national, and the global. Within 
the European context, sovereignty grew from the impulse towards independence 
following protracted tensions between medieval kings and external powers in the 
form of popes and emperors (Hinsely 1966). From the sixteenth century and up to 
the 1920s, power was transferred from local to national levels of governance, and 
then, through globalization, from national to global governance. The weakening of 
the role of the nation state since World War I led to a reversal of this transfer.
This paper attempts to elucidate the role of sovereignty within constitutional 
economics. In particular, an investigation is made into the nature of Spinozistic 
sovereignty and how it moves beyond an analysis of power relations, and into 
providing a normative discourse on the form of the state. To this end, the second 
section of the paper furnishes a brief introduction to sovereignty. The third section 
expands on sovereignty under the analogy between markets and politics. The fourth 
section elaborates on Spinoza’s understanding of sovereignty, especially his preferred 
structure for the state. The paper ends with some concluding remarks.
Sovereignty between absoluteness and divisibility
The literature on sovereignty provides a plethora of classes and categories.[4] Only a 
few of these are explored in some detail here. The aim is to clarify the links between 
constitutionalism and sovereignty, and trace the concept’s transformation from 
absolute sovereignty to a divided sovereignty. A key feature of sovereignty is power 
exchange. This exchange leads to a specific structure of the state. For example, 
Hobbesian sovereignty leads to a unitary state, whereas that of Spinoza favours a 
federal polity.
Etymologically, the word ‘sovereign’ derives from the popular Latin for ‘above’ 
(superānus), as in ‘more powerful’ (‘Sovereign’ 1989). The issues that arose in the 
early history of sovereignty were centred on the legitimization of this power by 
investigating its source and extent. However, sovereignty on the most part is a legal 
concept (Macdonald and Nielsson 1995). It is the power to make binding law in The Journal of Philosophical Economics VII:1 (2013) 5
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a particular territory. Within the European context, sovereignty grew from the 
impulse towards independence following protracted tensions between medieval kings 
and external powers (popes and emperors). The genesis of sovereignty lies in claims 
to local supremacy. It is this point that will be developed further by examining the 
link between sovereignty and constitutionalism.
Constitutionalism, especially in the context of states, is integral to sovereignty. 
Sovereignty is ‘constitutional independence’, ‘a claim to the exclusive right to 
make rules’ (Smith et al. 1999, 2.55), and hence ‘the first bulwark of constitutional 
government—as it implies the right to say no to outsiders’ (Rabkin 2005, p. 69). The 
starting point is to interpret the concept of constitution widely as the fundamental 
law principles from which the state draws its authority. Under this interpretation, 
constitutionalism can result either from a (revolutionary) contractarian 
approach, or through an evolutionary approach based on norms and conventions. 
Constitutionalism moderates the absoluteness of the sovereign’s power, making its 
exercise subject to authorization, while supplying internal sovereignty through 
legitimacy. Sovereignty is inseparable from constitutionalism. 
The pedigree of the link between sovereignty and constitutionalism can be traced 
through the long history of the contractarian approach.[5] Aristotle (2013) states 
that the constitution is the government, and the government is the sovereign in the 
state. This constitutional link to sovereignty is also seen in medieval Europe (Beard 
1935). In the history of sovereignty leading up to the European revolutionary 
upheavals in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, there is almost universal 
agreement that the foundation of sovereign power comes from an original contract 
(Merriam 1900), either between the government and the people (Althusius 1965), 
or between the people among themselves followed by a further agreement between 
people and government (Pufendorf), or a single contract in which the sovereign and 
the state are created simultaneously (Hobbes and Rousseau). Early formulations 
of sovereignty focused on deriving the power of the sovereign from the people as a 
whole, whereas later formulations reverted to individual ‘natural rights’. 
The sovereign state came to be conceived of as a territorial jurisdiction at the 
national scale (Jackson 1999). It was not until the rise of the federal states, as 
exemplified by the United States that a shift occurred in the analysis towards 
a possible divisibility of sovereignty. Hence, for Bodin (1955), who developed a 
political theory to serve as a fortification against anti-nationalism, sovereignty 
is always in service of a nation. Bodin signalled the advent of sovereignty’s 
absolutism, which reached its zenith in the seventeenth century with the Leviathan The Journal of Philosophical Economics VII:1 (2013) 6
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of Thomas Hobbes (1947). This absolutism meant that sovereignty could not be 
shared or divided. Absolutist sovereignty had intellectual opposition in the form 
of the Monarchomachs, epitomized by Johannes Althusius (1965), who revived the 
middle ages (democratic) trust-based theories of sovereignty. This approach was 
also dominated by a contractarian approach—again emphasizing the nexus between 
sovereignty and constitutionalism. More recently, Habermas (1996) elaborated on 
the idea that sovereignty is the people, underscoring the importance of involving ‘the 
people’ actively in rational decisions that guide sovereigns.
To the absolutist and trust-based theories of sovereignty is added a Germanic 
‘natural rights’ strand, which led to the articulation of theories by Samuel 
Pufendorf, John Locke, and Christian Wolff, among others. Under these theories, 
sovereignty’s absoluteness was watered down to mere supremacy, either in the person 
of a monarch, in the case of Germany, or through a (fiduciary) legislature, in the 
case of England. In France, however, the ‘natural rights’ discourse, especially that 
of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1797), was committed to a sovereignty that was absolute, 
infallible, and inalienable. In the 1794 French Revolution, sovereignty resided in 
the nation. Similarly, after the July 1830 Revolution, sovereignty emanated from 
the reason (intelligence) of the collective (community) as a whole. Now, it was 
the nation that was recognized as sovereign, not the monarch, nor reason in the 
absolute. By the time of the 1848 Revolution, the idea of sovereignty of the nation 
had gained general acceptance (Merriam 1900).
The German States exhibited a similar evolution, in which the seat of sovereignty 
was also shifted from the people to the state. However, the German tradition 
emphasized the need for an organic law—a constitution—binding the sovereign. 
The state, as a Platonic organism, was promoted as the new bearer of sovereignty. 
Here, the state was a product of evolution rather than revolution. This organic 
conception of the state follows a tradition extending from the Greeks through the 
middle ages, and registering acceptance in the theories of Althusius, Hobbes, and 
Pufendorf. 
However, Buchanan and Tullock (1962) reject the organic conception of the state. 
They point out that ‘[o]nly some organic conception of society can postulate the 
emergence of a mystical general will that is derived independent of the decision-
making process in which the political choices made by the separate individuals are 
controlling’ (p. 12). This rejection negates the possibility of treating the state as a 
legal person and hence closes the door on the jurisprudential dimension of the state, 
at least as discussed by Max Weber (1981). The organic-state tradition is diagonal The Journal of Philosophical Economics VII:1 (2013) 7
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to the Roman approach, in which the state never appeared as a distinct personality, 
‘but always the sum of the Roman citizens’ (Merriam 1900, p. 109). This is also the 
Wicksellian ideation at the crux of constitutional economics—that the state is the 
sum of its citizens: ‘If utility is zero for each individual member of the community, 
the total utility for the community cannot be other than zero’ (Wicksell 1994, p. 77).
Historically, a shift in theoretical emphasis was triggered by the growth of state 
federations, especially in the Swiss, German, and American contexts. The emphasis 
was now on division of sovereignty. A salient example is the 1789 United States 
Constitution, in which sovereignty was divided between the states and federal 
government. In the Federalist Papers, James Madison elaborated on the theoretical 
foundations of the possibility of a divided sovereignty in which the states were 
sovereign as long as their sovereignty was not affected by the constitution (Hamilton 
et al. 1852). The idea of divided sovereignty later found its way to Europe through 
Tocqueville (1856), although he was of the opinion that a divided sovereignty would 
be impractical in Europe given the presence of the great military monarchies of 
Europe. Similarly, John C. Calhoun (1853), in what could be considered an overture 
to the American Civil War, attacked the doctrine of divided sovereignty because it 
was contrary to the logical basis of secession. After the American Civil War, the 
nationalist movement gained the upper hand. The writings of Francis Lieber (1861), 
who found the location of an organic sovereignty in the nation, capture the essence 
of their drive. The same logic was followed by Jameson, Brownson, Hurd, Mulford, 
and Pomeroy (Merriam 1900).
The above brief history of sovereignty illustrates the origin of the state as a 
response to crises, at least in the European context. The evolution of the concept of 
sovereignty goes hand in hand with the civil wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries. The key point is the tension between absolute (i.e. undivided) and divided 
sovereignty, and the dominance of the former strand since the eighteenth century. 
Sovereignty and the analogy between markets and politics
This section examines how sovereignty is positioned relative to a core premise in 
constitutional economics, namely, the analogy between markets and politics. This 
analysis suggests that sovereignty under constitutional economics would have the 
characteristics of being relational (contractarian) and divided. As delineated in 
the next section, both characteristics dominate Spinoza’s conception of sovereignty. 
Without any constitutional safeguards in place, this relational basis continues to The Journal of Philosophical Economics VII:1 (2013) 8
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fray as sovereignty, predominantly through its economic rationale, amplifies the 
jurisdiction of the state.
To bring sovereignty into the exchange process inherent in markets, we need a 
relational definition. In constitutional economics, the market, as an evolutionary 
selection process, was extended to politics, by using an exchange paradigm to 
describe cooperative interactions (Buchanan 1991, 1993). This exchange analogy 
carries ‘relational’ tones in which ‘[b]oth the economic relation and the political 
relation represent co-operation’ (Buchanan and Tullock 1962, 19).[6]
Baruch Spinoza provides a relational definition of sovereignty. Sovereignty à 
la Spinoza is an abstract notion (albeit not ahistorical one) of ‘the relationship 
between rulers and ruled for the exercise of political power [and] the independent 
status of the body politic on the international stage’ (Prokhovnik 2001, p. 291). 
Under this understanding, sovereignty ‘is not a substantive quality to be possessed 
but rather a condition of political interactions, embedded in [relations] that ground 
association’ (Smith 2011, p. 426). Through this relational definition, sovereignty 
becomes the exchange taking place at the input to the process in which the state 
transforms power into authority. It is the source from which the state makes 
binding law in a particular territory.
A relational definition of sovereignty imports a small-scale organization of the 
state.[7] A stark difference exists between economic exchanges in large ‘modern’ 
societies and those registered in so-called ‘primitive’ societies (societies of relatively 
small size and lacking in technological and economic development). In these 
societies, economic transactions cannot be understood apart from ‘relational’ social 
obligations. For the analogy to work, a ‘relational’ level commensurate with that of 
politics is required, one in which participants take the interests of other participants 
(especially their long-term interests) into account. In contrast, the ‘theory of 
markets postulates only that the relationship be economic, that the interest of 
[the other party] in the exchange be excluded from consideration’ (Buchanan and 
Tullock 1962, 16). Politics is seen to exhibit efficiency similar to that of voluntary 
markets in which unanimity around the political process can judge the efficiency of 
collective action. This analogy suggests that ‘the average individual acts on the basis 
of the same over-all [sic] scale when he participates in market activity and political 
activity’ (Buchanan and Tullock 1962, p. 18). In this sense, there is a continuum 
between economic and political ‘exchanges’.The Journal of Philosophical Economics VII:1 (2013) 9
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Constitutional economics emphasizes cooperative forms of interaction through a 
contractarian approach in which legitimacy is assured through the agreement of 
all parties concerned. In contrast, politics—‘orthodox’ politics, to be precise—has 
a non-cooperative, ‘conflictual’ perspective, focusing on the distribution of value 
among winners and losers. However, in constitutional economics there would be 
no net losers. This last point has been critiqued on the grounds that ‘the analogy 
between politics and markets made by constitutional economists is theoretically 
weak and clouds rather than enhances our understanding of political economy. 
Politics has very little in common with non-coercive, voluntary exchange in 
the marketplace’ (Block and DiLorenzo 2000, p. 567). Note, however, that the 
theoretical approach to the state as a voluntary institution can be traced to 
Aristotle’s conviviality theory of the origin of the state, especially as delineated by 
Leopold Kohr (1978). The conflict-based origin of the state (notwithstanding its 
long tradition through the scholarship of Bodin, Hume, Turgot, and Nietzsche, 
among others) conflates the origin of the state with its operation beyond the 
constitutional phase. A sustained ‘production of scale’ phase (which increases 
the size of the political community) will result in such conflict. This is when 
the state continues to grow in size (larger territory, larger population, and larger 
government). However, that does not mean that the origin of the state is conflictual. 
The Hobbesian state of nature, in which he opined that conflict was the raison 
d’être for the state, was the product of Hobbes’s own Zeitgeist. At the constitutional 
level, politics would also lend itself to a cooperative analytical framework: ‘The 
market and the State are both devices through which co-operation is organized and 
made possible’ (Buchanan and Tullock 1962, p. 19).
Reconciling markets and politics as cooperative at the constitutional phase 
formulates the core issue as one of scale (Block and DiLorenzo 2000):
[D]isagreement with constitutional economics is more than a definitional one. 
Buchanan and Tullock label a wide range of seemingly voluntary collective choice 
institutions as ‘government’ and, admittedly, a reasonable case can be made that, 
say, a village fire department might make a good example of voluntary government, 
at least on a relatively small scale [emphasis added]. But the distinguishing 
characteristic is that in a truly voluntary setting the parties to an agreement have a 
right to secede from the agreement. (p. 580) 
The key words are ‘on a relatively small scale’. Of course, the above quote refers to 
only an element of the state, namely that of ‘government’ (the other main elements 
being population and territory), but it still gives a good illustration of the scalar The Journal of Philosophical Economics VII:1 (2013) 10
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anchor between markets and politics. The right to secede itself can be seen as 
indicative of a large polity still viable in the event of secession.
The analogy between markets and politics imports another dimension, in addition 
to the homo economicus and the exchange process. For markets to function properly 
(i.e. to be Pareto efficient), one needs to ensure a level of competition in the 
provision of goods and services. An analogy with politics would see this competition 
reflected in the provision of goods of a public nature, through competing 
jurisdictions.[8] Such competition, which is discussed in the next section, is salient 
in Spinoza’s sovereignty. 
Spinozistic sovereignty
Constitutional economics (à la Buchanan) does not accept absolute sovereignty 
(Brennan and Buchanan 2000). It sides instead with Spinoza (Buchanan and 
Tullock 1962). Spinoza separates the constitutional and operational levels of 
collective decision-making, hence paving the way for the possibility of a divided 
sovereignty. His preferred structure follows from this divided sovereignty and 
results in a polycentric commonwealth between independent cities. 
Note that some commentators question whether Spinoza in fact had a conception 
of sovereignty. Interested readers are referred to Prokhovnik (1997, 2001, 2004) 
for a detailed analysis on this point. For its purposes, this paper starts from the 
proposition that ‘Spinoza must by definition have a conception of sovereignty. 
According to this perspective, sovereignty is a general feature of all political 
societies across time and place, underlying the diversity of laws and institutions’ 
(Prokhovnik 2001, p. 290). His approach is similar to that of Hobbes, when he was 
able to use sovereignty to rank different forms of the state. However, while Hobbes 
reaches a conclusion in favour of the unitary state, Spinoza finds the form of 
federal polity superior.
Taking Holland as the point of reference for his analysis, Spinoza intended to show 
that ‘the failure of the experiment in Holland was not due to lack of zeal but to lack 
of theoretical understanding, and that the lack of theoretical understating requires 
more than mere theoretical understanding to remedy it’ (Gross 1996, p. 123). Hence, 
on the cover of his Treatise on Politics (TP), Spinoza (1958) declares his objective as 
‘[to show] how a Monarchy and an Aristocracy must be organized if they are not to 
degenerate into Tyranny, and if the Peace and Freedom of the citizens is to remain The Journal of Philosophical Economics VII:1 (2013) 11
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intact’. Spinoza declares that his ‘objective in applying [his] mind to politics is not 
to make any new or unheard of suggestions, but to establish by sound and conclusive 
reasoning, and to deduce from the real nature of man, nothing save the principles 
and institutions which accord best with practice’ (TP I 4).
For Spinoza, sovereignty is not repugnant to principles of provincial autonomy. In 
fact, it could be argued that ‘Spinoza’s notion of sovereignty is crucially designed as 
an instrument to defend the constitutional tradition, and not as an instrument to 
unify and strengthen the state. Its purpose is to check the development of centralized 
government, not to promote it’ (Prokhovnik 2001, p. 297). Spinoza (1958) follows 
a contractarian approach to sovereignty in which ‘breach of the contract [by the 
sovereign] is not punished by civil right but by the right of war’ (TP IV 6).
Spinoza (TP III 10) puts emphasis on understanding human nature and its effect on 
the obedience demanded of them as subjects. Spinoza sees the ‘right of the sovereign 
… in the fact that it was … the mind of the state by which all its subjects had to be 
guided … [the sovereign] alone had the right to make laws …’ (TP IV 1). He stresses 
that ‘the causes and natural foundations of the state are not to be sought in the 
precepts of reason, but must be deduced from the common nature or constitution of 
men’ (TP I 7).
According to Spinoza, ‘the virtue of a state is stability’ (TP I 6). Spinoza was 
writing in Latin and the word he used for stability is ‘securitas’, which could also 
be translated as security. Spinoza’s stability is akin to the idea of being protected 
from danger, which suggests an evolutionary connotation. Spinoza sees sovereignty 
in an evolutionary light: ‘[M]an, like everything else in nature, does his utmost to 
preserve his own being’ (TP II 7). In this sense, sovereignty guides the analysis for 
the structural form that best stabilizes the state. Hence, for Spinoza, sovereignty 
is a logical necessity (Prokhovnik 2001), a function of evolutionary fitness that 
prevents the state from collapse, and degeneration into tyranny is the first step into 
extinction. Accordingly, he states that:
if a state is to be capable of lasting, its administration must be so organized that it 
does not matter whether its rulers are led by reason or passion … In fact it makes 
no difference to the stability of a state what motive leads men to conduct its affairs 
properly, provided that they are conducted properly. (TP I 6)
Spinoza then goes on to state that ‘[t]he best condition of a commonwealth is easily 
discovered from the purpose of political order: which is simply peace and security of 
life’ (TP V 2). The Journal of Philosophical Economics VII:1 (2013) 12
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Spinoza advocates a sovereignty vested in several cities, in which:
all the cities are joined and bound together, not as allied states, but as constituent 
parts of one state … the power of the city constitutes a great part of the power of the 
state itself, and the larger the city, the greater its contribution to the power of the 
state; hence the cities cannot all be regarded as equal, but the right of each, like its 
power, must be determined by its size. (TP IX 4) 
Under this arrangement, ‘each city must remain in possession of its own right as 
far as possible, and must have more right in the government in proportion as it 
exceeds the others in power’ (TP IX 6). For Spinoza, this polycentric arrangement 
in which sovereignty is vested in several cities is superior to one in which a capital 
city dominates the state. He gives several arguments supporting his position. First, 
the fact that each city is represented in proportion to its power would increase 
competition between cities. This competition would lead to cities increasing their 
populations ‘by ruling more by kindness than by fear’ (TP IX 14). Moreover, 
sovereignty vested in several cities ‘needs no safeguards to prevent [it] from being 
overthrown by a sudden attack’, since the freedom ‘enjoyed by several cities’ makes 
it ‘not sufficient for [usurping] sovereignty to seize one city in order to gain control 
over the rest’ (TP IX 15). 
Note that this arrangement is different from the arrangements we see today in the 
United States and Australia. Spinozistic sovereignty provides a model: 
in which powers are shared between sovereign bodies … which reaffirm their 
separateness … In federal systems such as the United States or in Australia, 
legislative, judicial and executive powers are distributed between federal and different 
state governments … under [Spinozistic sovereignty], however, ‘confederal’ powers … 
were extremely closely restricted … Rather than attempting to harmonize differences 
… [it upholds] the constructiveness of difference … (Prokhovnik 2007, p. 228) 
Polycentric states are at the centre of Spinoza’s discourse. Buchanan (1990) echoes 
Spinoza when he explains his idea of federalism as ‘diversity among separate co-
operative communities, of shared sovereignty, of effective devolution of political 
authority and, perhaps most importantly, of the limits on such authority’ (pp. 3–4). 
Buchanan envisaged a ‘federal union within which members of separate units 
cooperate’ (p. 18) and share sovereignty, in which constitutional requirements 
guarantee free trade, and with a monetary constitution based on competing national 
currencies. The Journal of Philosophical Economics VII:1 (2013) 13
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Coda
Historically, sovereignty succumbed to the concept of ‘nation’. This resulted in 
sovereignty being conceived of as a one-dimensional possibility: a nation state 
either has it or it does not. It became an absolute quality. Sovereignty as understood 
today is ‘a right of membership, historically determined, in what amounts to a 
very exclusive political club’ (Jackson 1999, p. 449). This club of nation states is 
‘the most exclusive political club in the world and has been so for several centuries’ 
(Jackson 1999, p. 449). A sovereign state is conceived of as an exclusive territorial 
jurisdiction. Since the signing of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, and especially 
in the post-Napoleonic era (after 1815), ‘a prominent operating principle regulating 
the size and shape of states has indeed been that states should be contiguous and 
non-perforated’ (Kurrild-Klitgaard 2002, p. 146). This should be understood in 
relation to the observation that ‘the Westphalian State is … bound symbiotically 
to the ideology of nationalism’ (Tierney 2006, p. 245). The relationship between 
sovereignty and territory is captured by the principle of uti possidetis juris (Jackson 
1999). In particular, this principle subordinated the principle of self-determination 
to boundaries decided by colonial power: juridical territories trumped sociological 
territories.
It was not until the rise of federal states exemplified by the United States that a 
shift in the analysis towards the possible divisibility of sovereignty occurred. Today, 
the political state is ‘characterized by polycentric centers of power’ (Jayasuriya 
2006, p. 372). These centres of power are an extension of the idea of divisibility of 
sovereignty. However, using the analogy with the idea of a ‘polycentric’ legal order 
(implying a multiplicity of independent centres of decision-making) (Bell 1991; 
Hayek 1983), there is no extensive (economic) evaluation of the need for, or merit 
of, an analogous ‘polycentric’ constitutional order (Barnett 1998). The assumption 
is usually made that ‘there is a state or a commonwealth, without exploring the 
question of which domain [a scalar construct] this commonwealth or state should 
actually occupy, and in relation to what other public bodies’ (Backhaus 1999, 
p. 137). While conceding that some literature touches on the structure of the 
state and its relation to economic structures, emphasis should be on maximizing 
constitutional options rather than deciding among constraints per se. The ‘choice 
among constraints’ does not explain where the total set of available constraints 
arises in the first place. Constitutional economics seems to treat these constraints as 
exogenous—a consequence of not engaging sovereignty. The ability to distinguish 
between different scales (from the global to the local) goes a long way towards The Journal of Philosophical Economics VII:1 (2013) 14
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explaining how options are limited (and hence constraints created). This in turn 
results in a dynamic set of constraints from which to choose. However, this is 
available only when the structure of the state is made the subject of analysis. In 
particular, when questioning the national scale as the default level of analysis, a 
very different set of constraints emerges. 
Unfortunately, in constitutional economics, a taste of ‘Westphalia sovereignty’ 
and its emphasis on the nation state still lingers. Although ideas on sovereignty 
and jurisdiction are not usually treated explicitly, they can be gleaned from the 
assumptions typically made by constitutional economics. The central feature here 
is still the same as it has been since early discourse on political economy, which 
in fact is the same impetus underlying most theories of sovereignty: legitimization 
of the nation state. Even when scalar differentiation is engaged, it is never in 
relation to the state, but rather to government—leaving other elements of the state, 
especially territory and population, beyond systematic inquiry. Hence, we find 
discourse on the optimal size of government, but not on the optimal size of states, 
in which government is understood as only one element of the state, distinct from 
the latter’s territory. There has even been a tendency to treat ‘government’ and ‘state’ 
interchangeably, further disguising the essential issue of territoriality and the 
ensuing possibilities of divided sovereignty (Hayek 1983, p. 48).
A nuanced reading of Spinozistic sovereignty militates against the existence 
of colossal jurisdictions. One can trace the logic of limiting the jurisdiction of 
states within a polycentric constitutional set-up back to Aristotle. Although some 
pronouncements from constitutional economics echo the same ideas, constitutional 
economics would not pass muster unless it is understood that the golden principle 
for constitutional design is the inquiry into how states can be engineered along the 
lines of Spinoza’s federal polity. This aspect of the analysis has not yet received 
much emphasis when it comes to normative constitutional design. It is submitted 
that such emphasis would lead to countries as large as Russia and China, and even 
the United States, being questioned as to their stability in the post-constitutional 
phase.
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Endnotes
[1] See for example Beard (1935). 
[2] See for example Halleberg (2011).
[3] For the key work on the concept of universitas, see Oakeshott (1975). 
[4] A caveat Veitch et al. (2007):
Sovereignty, like so many terms that straddle the boundary between law and politics, 
is a concept denoting a cluster of related ideas rather than one single clearly defined 
one. Moreover, in nearly all its clustered elements, it is a contested concept, in the 
sense that different theoretical approaches dispute over its correct explanation or 
definition, usually also disagreeing about its practical relevance. (p. 10–11)
[5] For the purposes of this paper, no distinction needs to be made between 
contractarian-ism and the original-contract approach.
[6] This formulation of a political power exchange has a Foucauldian overtone, in 
which power is a ‘certain type of relation between individuals’ (Foucault 2000, p. 324).
[7] For a clearer understanding of the size of population that would constitute a 
small organization, refer to Kohr (1978).
[8] This jurisdictional competition could be linked to what came to be known as 
systems competition (Sinn 2002).
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